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T.: Abatement and Revival--Death of the Wrongdoer
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL -

DEATH OF THE WRONGDOER. -

A

deputy sheriff wrongfully shot P causing him bodily injury. The
deputy having died before suit could be brought, P joined the personal representative of the decedent and the bonding company in
an action. Held, that notwithstanding the provisions of the code as
amended, 1 the common law rule, that an action for personal injuries
not resulting in death does not survive the death of the wrongdoer, prevails. Byrd, Sheriff v. Byrd2
At common law no tort action survives the death of either the
wrongdoer or the injured person.3 Various reasons are given for
denying liability.4 The legislative inroad on this doctrine began
with the famous "Lord Campbell's Act"," giving a right of action against the wrongdoer when the personal injuries resulted in
death. Statutory provisions to the same effect were soon adopted in
the United States.' The West Virginia statute, as it existed until
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 5: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect
or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof, then, and
in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which, would have been
liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured .....
"
W. Va. Acts 1931, c.
20 [W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art. 7, § 5J, adds the following sentence: "Any right of action which may hereafter accrue by reason of such
injury done to the person of another shall survive the death of the wrong-doer,
and may be enforced against the executor or administrator, either by reviving
against such personal representative a suit which may have been brought
against the wrong-doer himself in his lifetime, or by bringing an original suit
against his personal representative after his death, whether or not the death
of the wrong-doer occurred before or after the death of the injured party."
(Italics supplied.)
2 7 S. E. (2d) 507 (W. Va. 1940).
3 Flint v. Gilpin, 29 W. Va. 740, 742, 3 S. E. 33 (1887); The Harrisburg
v. Rickards, 119 U. S. 199, 201, 7 S. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed. 358 (1886); Brown V.
Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 256, 261, 162 S. E. 613 (1932); Coliseum Motor Co. v.
Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 299, 3 P. (2d) 105 (1931).
4 Some authorities base the rule on the maxim, "Aotio personaUs moritur
cam persona." Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 168 U. S. 445, 448, 18 S. Ct.
105, 42 L. Ed. 537 (1897); Flint v. Gilpin, 29 W. Va. 740, 742, 3 S. E. 33
(1887). One commentator says it is against public policy to permit the value
of a human life to become the subject of computation. 6 THOMPsON, NEGi,GENCE (2d ed. 1905) § 6980. Other authorities say there should be no recovery against the estate of the wrongdoer because the tort action is considered
as punitive in nature and consequently the death of the wrongdoer obviates
this necessity. Comment (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1018; POLL~oo, Tors
(12th ed. 1923) 61.
59 & 10 VIcm. c. 93 (1846).
a New York adopted a similar act in 1847. 8 R. C. L. 724.
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was interpreted not to change the common law rule that the
cause of action for personal injuries died with the wrongdoer."
The contention in the present case was that the amendment 9
had changed the common law rule, but the court held that the
statute as amended applies only when the injuries result in death."
Whether we construe such statutes strictly, as some courts advise,
because they consider them to be in derogation of the common law,"
or liberally, as other courts, including West Virginia, advise, because they claim them to be remedial, 12 only one conclusion can be
drawn -the court was correct in its interpretation. The language
used in the statute is plain, its meaning clear, and it should not, by
judicial interpretation, be extended beyond its obvious import. 3
Some time before the present case, the Special Committee on
Code Correction, in one of its reports to the West Virginia Bar
Association,' 4 listed the amended section as defective. The flaw
pointed out was the one demonstrated by this case, that is, the
omission of a provision giving a right of action against the personal representative for personal injuries of a less than fatal na7 W. V&. REV. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 5. The pertinent part of the section is quoted supra n.1.

8 Martin v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 151 U. S. 673, 695, 14 S. Ct. 533, 38 L.
Ed. 311 (1893); Curry v. Mannington, 23 W. Va. 14, 18 (1883); Flint v.
Gilpin, 29 W. Va. 740, 742, 3 S. E. 33 (1887).
o W. Va. Acts 1931, c. 20. This amendment is set forth sspra n.1.
10 The court gave two reasons: (1) "By reason of such injury done to the
person of another" was held to mean an injury resulting in death as was
previously referred to in the section, the sole and only purpose of the amendment being to cause an action for wrongful death to survive as against the
personal representative of the wrongdoer. (2) Under the title of the act there
is no place for legislation relating to anything other than actions for wrongful
death, and it must be assumed that the legislature did not intend to include
matters not within the title of the act.
Although not mentioned by the court, it would seem that the concluding
words of the act, " whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or
after the death of the injured party", necessarily indicate that only if the
injuries result in death can the amendment be applicable.
" Central of Ga. Ry. v. Henson, 121 Ga. 462, 463, 49 S. E. 278 (1904);
Strottman v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 211 Mo. 227, 258, 109 S.W. 769 (1908) ;
Fubrano v. Atlantic Mills, 19 R. I. 129, 133, 32 Atl. 205 (1895).
12 Richards v. Riverside Ironworks, 56 W. Va. 510, 515, 49 S. E. 437 (1904) ;
Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 168 U. S.445, 448, 18 S. Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed.
537 (1897); White v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 125 Kan. 537, 538, 265 Pac. 73
(1928) ; Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 561, 257 N. W. 377 (1934).
1 Kellar v. James, 63 W. Va. 139, 142, 59 S.E. 939 (1907) ; Regan v. Davis,
290 Pa. 167, 172, 138 Atl. 751 (1927); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Town of Cape
Charles, 144 Va. 56, 63, 131 S.E. 437 (1926) ; Chesapeake & 0. R. R. v. Bullington's Adm'r, 135 Va. 307, 316, 116 S.B. 237 (1923). "This would be but
an assumption by the judicial of the duties of the legislative department",
Swift v. Luce, 27 Me. 285, 286 (1847).
14 W. VA.BAn Ass'N REP. (1934) 178.
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ture inflicted by the deceased tortfeasor. The report of the committee was actuated by correspondents who could not understand
why relief should be granted when a husband or father was killed,
and yet relief not be granted in cases where, because of injuries
sustained, his existence would be an added liability, irrespective
of whether the deceased wrongdoer left an abundant estate. Another
question asked was why recovery against the estate of the wrongdoer would be more burdensome on his family than satisfaction
against his estate of a judgment secured before his death.
The difficulty of finding an adequate answer to these queries
leads one to believe that the omission was one of inadvertence rather
than intention on the part of the legislature. The recurrence of
the result reached in this case is undesirable and should be avoided
by an express statutory provision changing the existing law.
L. E. T., II.
ADMINIjSTR-ATIOz

Or

ESTATES

-

FOREIGN

ADMINISTRATOR

RIGHT To SuE IN WEST VIRGINIA. - P, a citizen of Indiana and
administrator of X, sued D, a citizen of West Virginia, to recover
for the death of X resulting from wrongful acts committed by D
in West Virginia. Held, that an administrator appointed in Indiana cannot maintain an action in West Virginia. Rybolt v. Jarrett. 1
The court's conclusion was based upon a West Virginia
statute, restrictive in nature, providing that "Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no person not a resident of this State shall
be appointed or act as executor, administrator, curator, guardian,
or committee . . . ." The application of this statute achieves the
same result as the general common law rule that, in the absence
of a statute permitting it, a personal representative may sue only
in the state of his appointment.'
In a majority of the jurisdictions, however, a foreign representative is frequently permitted to sue by comity when the citizens
1112 P. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).

See
2W. VA. CODz (Miehie, 1937) c. 44, art. 5, § 3. (Italics supplied.)
also a recent case, Monfils v. Hazlewood, 10 S. E. (2d) 673 (N. C. 1940), in
which a similar restrictive statute, N. C. CODE (.4ichie, 1939) c. 1, art. 3, § 8,
was construed as precluding the foreign administrator from suing in a wrongful death case.
3RESTATEMExT, CoxmLCT OF LAWS (1934) § 507; id. W. VA. ANNoT. (1937)

§ 507. This section collects the West Virginia cases in accord with the gdneral
common law rule and concludes also that "Ithere is no statute in West Virginia
permitting a foreign administrator to sue."
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